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Numerous studies have examined the relationship between income inequality and trade 
openness. This paper departs from previous work by considering a possible non-linear 
relationship between trade openness and inequality. The evidence is consistent with the idea 
of a Kuznets curve: inequality increases until a critical level of openness is reached after 
which inequality begins to fall. The finding of a non-linear relationship between trade 
openness and inequality implies that governments in Latin America should introduce 
redistribution policies, alongside trade liberalisation measures, so as to ease the adverse 
effects of trade liberalisation.  
   




 1. Introduction 
 
According to Kuznets (1955), income inequality increases until a critical income level 
is attained, after which inequality begins to decrease. The graphical representation of this 
hypothesis is an inverted U shaped (Kuznets) curve. Researchers have also examined the 
Kuznets hypothesis in other situations with one of the most well known being the relationship 
between inequality and environmental factors (such as pollution intensity). This line of 
research tends to generate an inverted U shaped curve, known as the environmental Kuznets 
curve (for example, Shafik, 1994).  
A further line of inquiry has been the relationship between income inequality and 
trade liberalisation. In some studies greater openness is found to increase inequality (for 
example, Gourdon et al, 2006; Chen, 2007) while in other studies the opposite is true (for 
example, Reuveny and Li, 2003). In some cases, the openness variable is found to be 
statistically insignificant (for example, Dollar and Kray, 2002; Perry and Olarreaga, 2006). A 
question that naturally follows is whether the relationship between trade openness and 
inequality is consistent with the Kuznets curve hypothesis. One good reason for investigating 
the idea of an openness Kuznets curve is the implication for policy. If the available evidence 
points to greater openness worsening inequality, governments may well be tempted to 
abandon the liberalisation programme. However, if the relationship between openness and 
inequality is non-linear there will be gains, hence there is a case for continuing with the 
policy. In this situation, redistribution policies need to go hand in hand with liberalisation 
policies so as to ease the adverse effects.  
In this paper we examine the Kuznets curve hypothesis using data for Latin America. 
At various times over the past two decades or so all countries in Latin America have 
introduced trade liberalisation policies. Chile was the first to begin the liberalisation process 
in the late 1970s followed by Bolivia, Mexico, Costa Rica and Venezuela in the mid 1980s and Argentina, Brazil, Colombia and Peru in the late 1980s/early 1990s. By the end of the 
1990s all countries had made progress with trade liberalisation. The fact that countries have 
liberalised trade at different times makes the region an especially suitable one for testing the 
Kuznets stages of development hypothesis. Furthermore, the fact that Latin America did not 
have a comparative advantage in unskilled labour at the time liberalisation policies were 
introduced means we ought to see inequality increase before it begins to fall. The basis for 
this argument is as follows. 
Greater openness will reward low income groups, and so help to reduce disparities in 
income, where countries have a comparative advantage in unskilled labour. While it is true to 
say that Latin America has a large pool of unskilled labour, there is relatively more of it in 
other parts of the world (for example, China and India). At the time of trade liberalisation in 
Latin America countries like China and India were already emerging on the world trade 
scene, to the extent that by the 1980s and 1990s Latin America’s comparative advantage had 
likely shifted from unskilled labour to natural resources (Wood, 1999). In this situation, an 
increase in openness may result in a worsening of inequality. However, once an economy has 
reached a certain level of openness, more (low income) people benefit via the multiplier 
effect, hence inequality is expected to fall. Also, given that trade liberalisation is preceded by 
fiscal reform, the tax revenues from firms that take advantage of liberalisation can be 
invested directly in employment-promoting activities or social programmes that improve 
education and health care. Furthermore, with trade liberalisation comes an increase in imports 
from countries with a comparative advantage in unskilled labour. Since the price of these 
goods is lower than they would be if they were produced domestically and since such goods 
are primarily consumed low income groups, these groups see a rise in their real income.  
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 describes the data and 
empirical model. The results are reported Section 3 while the final section concludes.   
2. Data and Empirical Model 
The empirical model to be estimated is: 
=+ + it it i it Gini X A β ε      = = (i 1,....n;t 1,......T )     (1) 
where Gini is a measure of income inequality for country i at time t. Xit contains all regressors 
which vary across time and countries. The parameter Ai contains a constant and individual 
specific variables that are invariant over time (for example, location and history)
1 and εit is 
the classical error term. Within Xit we include a variable for trade openness, measured in 
levels and as a squared term (to capture potential non-linearity). We adopt two widely used 
measures of openness for which data are available and which enable us to test the non-linear 
hypothesis: (i) the ratio of exports plus imports (total trade) to GDP (xmgdp) and (ii) average 
tariff rate (atr).
 Though the trade ratio is an imperfect proxy for trade policy for a number of 
reasons
2, greater openness is reflected in a larger traded sector relative to total production. 
The average tariff rate is a more direct measure of a country’s openness since it is a policy 
based variable, capturing the severity of trade restrictions in a country. This dimension is 
important because even though actual trade performance may be poor, incentives to foster 
investment and trade in poor countries (via low tariff rates) are a good proxy for trade 
liberalisation.
3 Using two measures of openness also serves as a robustness check for the 
results. The two measures of openness are plotted in Figure 1. As expected, there is an 
inverse relationship between the two: a reduction in the average tariff rate provides a boost to 
trade, hence a rise in the trade ratio.  
The other variables within Xit are primary school gross enrolment rates (primary), the 
share of agriculture in total output (aggdp), the rate of inflation (inflation), cumulative 
privatisation as a percentage of GDP (privgdp) and corruption (corrupt).  Education is an 
investment in human capital and so should contribute to a lowering of inequality. An 
expansion of the labour intensive agricultural sector is expected to increase employment levels and reduce inequality. Inflation reduces the real net worth of an individual and the 
impact will be relatively larger on low income groups, hence inequality is expected to 
worsen. Privatisation is expected to worsen inequality. With privatisation comes an 
increasing emphasis on efficiency and profit maximisation. This is likely to result in a 
substitution of less skilled labour for skilled workers and in increase in prices for previously 
public goods. Privatisation may also result in the elimination of subsides to public services 
which are sometimes genuinely redistributive. Countries with more corruption (in 
government) are expected to see increases in inequality because policies tend to favour higher 
income groups. For example, in education a higher proportion of spending will go towards 
tertiary rather than primary education.
4,5  
The dependent variable is a standard measure of income inequality, the Gini 
coefficient. The data on inequality is drawn from the United Nations World Income 
Inequality Database (UN-WIDER, 2005).
6 We use the new quality label provided in Version 
2a, which combines and improves the quality ratings in Deininger and Squire (1996) with 
older versions of the data. Data classified as the lowest quality is excluded. Only data which 
cover both the entire population and the whole area of the country is used. For each country, 
we form the longest possible series of observations. A summary of the years of available data 
for the Gini coefficient for each country is provided in Table 1. Blank cells in the table 
indicate that there are fewer than three observations for the decade. Not surprisingly, there are 
more observations for the 1990s.  
Data on the trade to GDP ratio and GDP per capita is obtained from Penn World 
Tables, Version 6.1 (Heston, Summers, and Aten, 2002).
7 The average tariff rate is an 
unweighted measure, obtained from the World Bank (Data on Trade and Import Barriers).
8 
Corruption data is obtained from the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG).
9 Data on 
education is obtained from the Global Development Network Growth Database
10 and data on privatisation (cumulative percentage of GDP) is taken from Lora (2001), which covers the 
period 1985-1999. For years prior to 1985 the cumulative percentage figure is zero since the 
1985 figure for all countries is zero. For the year 2000 the privatisation value was calculated 
from World Bank data (privatisation website).
11 All other data is obtained from the World 
Bank’s World Development Indicators (2005). Descriptive statistics are presented in Table 2.  
Before reporting the estimation results, we provide a visual description of the 
relationship between inequality and (both measures of) openness. Figure 2 shows the 
relationship between the Gini coefficient and the trade ratio in levels, while the relationship 
in changes is shown in Figure 3.
12 In Figure 2 inequality increases with the trade ratio until a 
critical level of the trade ratio is attained, after which inequality begins to decrease. Figure 3 
provides further support for the Kuznets curve hypothesis.  
Figures 4 shows the levels relationship between the Gini coefficient and the average 
tariff rate. Since the trade ratio and the average tariff rate are inversely related (Figure 1), the 
curve in Figure 4 is, as expected, U shaped. Thus, as the tariff rate increases from low levels, 
inequality falls before rising once a critical tariff rate is reached. The relationship between 
changes in the Gini coefficient and changes in the average tariff rate is shown in Figure 5. 
This further supports the idea of a non-linear relationship.
13   
 
3. Results 
The empirical estimation is conducted over the period 1980-2000 for 18 Latin 
American countries using panel estimation methods.
14 The data is annual and the panel is 
unbalanced. One concern in estimating equation (1) is the possible endogeneity of the control 
variables. Additionally, if there is correlation between at least one explanatory variable and 
the error term, OLS estimates will suffer from simultaneity bias. In order to deal with both potential problems, an instrumental variable (IV) methodology is adopted. Because of data 
limitations we are only able to instrument for the corruption variable.
15  
The results of estimating equation (1) are reported in Tables 3 and 4. In both tables, 
model (1) is estimated using pooled OLS. In model (2) fixed effects (not reported) are added. 
Model (3) is the same as model (2) except it deals with the endogeneity issue mentioned 
above. According to the Hausman test a fixed effects model is preferred to a random effects 
model. On the basis of the Sargan test and an F-test from the first stage regression we 
conclude that the instruments used (model 3) are acceptable.  
The results in Table 3 provide evidence for an inverted U shaped curve between 
inequality and the trade ratio. As expected, the coefficient on the levels term is positive and it 
is negative on the squared term. The results are statistically significant in models (2) and (3). 
Inequality rises with openness but then falls once a critical level of the trade ratio has been 
reached. The fact that the relationship also holds for a sub sample of countries indicates the 
robustness of the results.
16 The critical level for the trade ratio is the mid to high seventies; 
once the trade ratio goes above this figure further increases in openness will reduce 
inequality, ceteris paribus.
17 
The results in Table 4 for the average tariff rate confirm the findings for the trade 
ratio. As expected, the coefficient on the levels term is negative and it is positive on the 
squared term. The results are statistically significant. Inequality falls with increases in the 
average tariff rate but then rises once a critical tariff level is reached. The relationship 
between inequality and the tariff rate also holds for a sub sample of countries.
18 The critical 
level for the average tariff rate is approximately 19 per cent; once the tariff rate goes above 
this figure inequality will rise, ceteris paribus.  
The finding of a non-linear relationship between openness and inequality in both 
Tables 3 and 4 suggests that the results are robust to alternative measures of openness. Regardless of which measure of trade openness we use, the results for the other variables in 
Tables 3 and 4 are as expected. Inequality falls with less corruption (an improvement in the 
corruption index), with a higher ratio of agriculture to GDP, and with higher primary school 
gross enrolment rates. However, inequality worsens with an increase in inflation and greater 
privatisation.  
 
4. Conclusion  
 
This paper has explored the relationship between income inequality and trade 
liberalisation in Latin America. The evidence is in favour of the Kuznets curve hypothesis - 
trade liberalisation worsens inequality until a critical level of openness is reached after which 
inequality begins to fall. Support for an openness Kuznets curve is consistent with Latin 
America not having a comparative advantage in unskilled labour so that when liberalisation is 
begun the benefits do not accrue to low income groups. Once trade openness reaches a 
critical level, inequality is reduced due to multiplier effects and lower prices of labour 
intensive imports. Governments should continue with liberalisation policies but, at the same 











1 It is appropriate to include time (year) dummies when the number of years is small relative 
to the number of countries (Wooldridge, 2006). Since this is not the case in this study, time 
dummies are not included.      
2 The trade ratio measure is likely to pick up the effects of technological progress, exchange 
rate changes, and economic cycles.  
3 This measure also has disadvantages. For example, if average tariff rates are unweighted a 
disproportionate weight may be given to tariffs on commodities which represent a small 
fraction of imports (but have a high rate). On the other hand, if the tariff rates are weighted 
this may give no weight to certain goods, hence they would be completely ignored. Also, the 
average tariff rate (whether weighted or not) makes no allowance for non-tariff barriers. 
4 The corruption variable is measured on a scale from zero (most corrupt) to six (least 
corrupt). A rise in the corruption index is expected, a priori, to lead to a fall in inequality (the 
sign on the coefficient corrupt is expected to be negative).
 
5 In inequality studies several other explanatory variables have been used, including variables 
to represent financial development, land distribution, mineral resource abundance, 
governance and so on. We tried various combinations of these variables as well as interacting 
variables, but the results were not improved. One possible reason for this is that while these 
variables can be important in explaining differences across a diverse group of countries, they 
are less important in explaining inequality across more homogenous countries in the same 
region.  
6 www.wider.unu.edu/wiid/wwwwiid.htm 




 9 The corruption index is collected and published annually by Political Risk Services (PRS). 
See www.prsgroup.com. This measure focuses on corruption in government; it is intended to 
capture the likelihood that high government officials will demand special payments and the 
extent to which illegal payments are expected throughout lower levels of government. The 






12 The key regression results are those for a fixed effects model. If the model is well specified 
the sign on the coefficients from a levels regression should be the same as in a regression in 
first differences. For this reason, it is useful to show a plot of changes in inequality and 
changes in openness.   
13 Figure 5 is based on fewer observations than Figure 3 because of missing (annual) values 
for the average tariff rate for some countries. This means that when the data is differenced we 
lose even more observations.     
14 Countries in the sample: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, 
Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, 
Paraguay, Peru, El Salvador, Uruguay, and Venezuela. 
15 We instrument for corruption using democracy and ethnicity (see Gupta et al, 2002). 
16 We ran models (2) and (3) dropping each country sequentially, as well as pairs of 
countries, to see whether the results are being driven by a few special cases. This could 
happen, for example, if there are outliers or if there are many more observations for one or 
two countries relative to others. The results were not changed, hence we conclude that the 
non-linear result is general. Results are available on request from the authors.  17 When we estimate models (2) and (3) for a sub sample of countries (as in note 16), there is 
a small change in the turning points. For example, when we drop the two smallest countries 
(Jamaica and Nicaragua) with the highest trade ratios, the turning points are 76.9 for model 
(2) and 75 for model (3). Full results are available on request.  
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 Table 1 Data availability for the Gini coefficient  
Country  Years of available data Movement  in  Inequality
1980s           1990s 
Argentina  All except 1984  ↑  ↑ 
Bolivia  1984, 1989-90, 1992-93, 1995-97, 1999, 2000    ↓↑ 
Brazil  1980-90, 1992-93, 1995-99  ↑  ↓ 
Chile   All except 1997  ↑  stable 
Columbia  1980, 1982-83, 1985, 1988-89, 1991-2000  ↓  ↑ 
Costa Rica  1981-83, 1986, 1989-98, 2000  stable  stable 
Dominican Republic  1984,1986, 1989, 1992, 1995-98, 2000  ↑  ↑ 
Ecuador  1987-88, 1994-95, 1998-2000  ↑  ↑ 
Guatemala  1987-88, 1997, 1998, 2000    stable 
Honduras 1986,  1989-99  ↑  stable 
Jamaica   1988-93, 1995-2000  ↑  stable 
Mexico  1984, 1989, 1992, 1994, 1998, 2000    ↓ 
Nicaragua   1993, 1998, 2000    ↓ 
Peru  1981, 1991, 1994, 1997-2000    stable 
Paraguay   1983, 1990, 1994-95, 1997, 1999    ↑ 
El Salvador  1990-91, 1994-2000    stable 
Uruguay  1980-87, 1989, 1992, 1995-98, 2000  ↑  stable 
Venezuela All  ↑  stable 
Key: ↑ increase in Gini coefficient; ↓ decrease in Gini coefficient; stable = no change in Gini 
coefficient Table 2 Summary statistics 
Variable Mean  Standard 
deviation 
Minimum Maximum Observations
Logarithm of GDP per capita 
(PPP adjusted) 
8.68 0.40  7.69  9.38  398 
Ratio of agriculture to GDP   14.11  7.57  4.10  37.96  387 
Gini coefficient  49.97  6.55  36.69  63.28  219 
Privatisation (cumulative % of 
GDP) 
2.31 3.86  0  21.8  210 
Primary (gross enrolment rates)  105.36  9.47  79.1  165.96  214 
Corruption   3.08  0.87  1.00  5.00  219 
Inflation (GDP deflator, annual)  202.24  1102.43  -31.52  13611.63  398 
Exports + imports/GDP  51.16  30.02  9.12  138.01  398 
Average tariff rate (unweighted)  17.80  3  10.06  61  222 
 
 Table 3 Income inequality and openness (trade ratio measure) 
Independent  
variables 
Pooled OLS  
(1) 


































































      
R-squared 0.26  0.84  0.84 
Turning point 
for trade ratio* 
20.99 78.24 76.79 
Observations 204  204  204 
Hausman   18.910 
(0.020) 
 
Sargan     0.579 
F-1
st    10.737 
robust p values are in parentheses 
^ fixed effects are not reported 
* calculated using pre-rounded coefficient values 
 
 Table 4 Income inequality and openness (average tariff rate) 
Independent  
variables 
Pooled OLS  
(1) 


































































      
R-squared 0.33  0.86  0.88 
Turning point 
for tariff rate* 
27.17 19.43  18.96 
Observations 144  144  156 
Hausman   38.06 
(0.000) 
 
Sargan     1.648 
F-1
st     12.456 
robust p values are in parentheses 
^ fixed effects are not reported 
* calculated using pre-rounded coefficient values 
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